Sexual Harassment Lawyers Texas – The New §§ 21.141 and 21.142 Framework

How Texas sexual harassment law fundamentally changed on September 1, 2021

For more than three decades — from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), through Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), and through the body of Title VII and Texas Chapter 21 case law that followed — the operative legal standard for workplace sexual harassment in Texas required the plaintiff to establish that the conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Texas Chapter 21 imported the same standard from Title VII through the conformity-with-federal-law construction principle. The result was a Texas legal landscape in which a substantial range of offensive workplace sexual conduct — including conduct that produced documented humiliation, distress, and workplace dysfunction — was not actionable because it did not meet the high threshold of severity or pervasiveness.

That changed on September 1, 2021. The Texas Legislature, through Senate Bill 45 and House Bill 21, fundamentally rewrote Texas workplace sexual harassment law. The 2021 amendments did not refine the existing framework; they replaced it. The new framework — codified at Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.141 and 21.142, with corresponding limitations period changes in § 21.201(g) — operates as a distinct statutory regime that does not require the “severe or pervasive” showing, does not require alteration of the terms and conditions of employment, and does not depend on the federal Title VII framework that controlled the prior analysis.

The five fundamental changes the 2021 amendments made

Senate Bill 45 and House Bill 21 made five distinct and consequential changes to Texas sexual harassment law. Each operates independently and each substantially expands worker protection beyond what was available under prior law.

The text of Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.141 and 21.142

The 2021 framework is contained primarily in two new statutory sections — § 21.141 (definitions) and § 21.142 (the new unlawful employment practice) — alongside corresponding amendments to § 21.201(g) (limitations) and other provisions.

The pre-2021 framework compared to the post-2021 framework

The 2021 changes affected nearly every doctrinal element of Texas sexual harassment law. The differences between the pre-2021 framework (which still controls for federal Title VII claims and for Texas conduct before September 1, 2021) and the post-2021 framework (which controls for Texas conduct on or after September 1, 2021) are stark.

The three elements of a § 21.142 claim

Section 21.142 creates a discrete unlawful employment practice with three elements. Unlike the older framework, which treated the employer’s response as either an element of liability or a defense, the new framework places the employer’s response at the center of the claim itself.

What “immediate and appropriate corrective action” means in practice

The “immediate and appropriate corrective action” standard under § 21.142(b) is the operative test for employer response to sexual harassment under the new framework. Texas courts have not yet developed substantial case law interpreting the standard — the 2021 amendments are still recent, and the body of appellate authority remains thin. The statutory text and analogous frameworks from other jurisdictions, however, provide meaningful guidance on how the standard operates in practice.

“Immediate” — the temporal dimension

The 2021 amendments deliberately replaced the older “prompt” standard with “immediate.” The change is meaningful: “immediate” connotes greater temporal urgency than “prompt.” Courts applying similar standards in other jurisdictions have construed “immediate” to require action within days rather than weeks, with the specific timeframe depending on the severity of the conduct and the practical demands of investigation. Investigations delayed for weeks or months — even where they ultimately produce findings — generally do not satisfy an “immediate” standard. The Texas statute does not specify the precise number of days, but the legislative shift from “prompt” to “immediate” signals that delay tolerated under the older standard is no longer tolerated under the new.

“Appropriate” — the substantive dimension

“Appropriate” requires substantive sufficiency in the corrective action — not merely formal action, but action reasonably calculated to address the harassment and prevent its recurrence. Typical “appropriate” measures include:

• Documented investigation. The investigation must be documented in writing, with interview notes, witness statements, and findings recorded. Investigations conducted only verbally, or with no written record, do not meet the substantive sufficiency requirement.
• Confidential handling. The complaint and investigation must be handled confidentially. Disclosure of the complaint to others not involved in the investigation — particularly disclosure to coworkers of the complainant — generally violates the confidentiality element of appropriate response and may itself constitute retaliation.
• Separation of complainant and harasser. Pending investigation and any disciplinary outcome, the complainant should be protected from continued exposure to the alleged harasser. Continued scheduling of complainant and harasser together typically does not meet the appropriate-action requirement.
• Discipline commensurate with the misconduct. If investigation substantiates harassment, discipline of the harasser must be commensurate with the conduct’s severity. Verbal “talks,” informal warnings, and de minimis discipline that does not address the substantive misconduct generally do not meet the appropriate-action requirement.
• Adherence to the employer’s own policies. Where the employer has written policies on sexual harassment investigation, deviation from those policies — including failure to follow required investigation protocols, failure to document, and failure to discipline — is generally evidence of inappropriate response.

Common failure-to-respond patterns

Several patterns of employer non-response recur in sexual harassment matters and generally do not satisfy the § 21.142(b) standard:

• The “no investigation at all” pattern. The employer takes no documented action in response to the complaint, conducting at most informal verbal inquiries that produce no record.
• The “delayed investigation” pattern. The employer conducts an investigation only weeks or months after the complaint, often only after the worker retains counsel or files an EEOC/TWC charge.
• The “confidentiality breach” pattern. The supervisor or HR representative discloses the complaint to coworkers, undermining the complainant’s privacy and exposing the complainant to social retaliation in the workplace.
• The “no separation” pattern. The employer continues to schedule the complainant and the harasser together, requiring continued workplace interaction.
• The “de minimis discipline” pattern. The employer responds to substantiated harassment with verbal “talks” or other minimal discipline that does not address the substantive conduct.
• The “ghost-write the harasser’s statement” pattern. The employer has a manager or HR representative draft the harasser’s statement, which the harasser then merely signs — producing a documentary record that does not reflect the harasser’s own account.
• The “transfer the complainant” pattern. Rather than disciplining the harasser, the employer transfers the complainant to a different location or position — effectively penalizing the complainant for reporting.

Sexual harassment retaliation under § 21.055

Sexual harassment matters very frequently include retaliation components. Workers who report sexual harassment internally — to a supervisor, HR, or other employer representative — engage in protected activity under Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055, which prohibits employers from retaliating against persons who oppose discriminatory practices, file charges, file complaints, or participate in investigations, proceedings, or hearings under Chapter 21.

The four elements of a § 21.055 retaliation claim

1. Protected activity. The worker engaged in protected activity — reporting sexual harassment internally, filing a TWC or EEOC charge, opposing harassment, or participating in an investigation. The protection extends regardless of the ultimate merits of the underlying harassment claim — “the employee is not required to show that there was actual existence of an unlawful practice.” The standard is whether the worker had an objectively and subjectively reasonable good-faith belief that the reported conduct was sexual harassment.
2. Adverse employment action. The employer took action that “objectively might well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Write-ups that contribute to a point system that can lead to termination, increased scrutiny, denial of opportunities, demotion, transfer, and termination all qualify.
3. Causal connection. A causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Temporal proximity is powerful evidence; pattern of escalating discipline following the report is also probative; learning of counsel retention immediately followed by adverse action is particularly suggestive.
4. Reasonable belief standard. Per Texas DOT v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. 2021), the worker need not use “magic words” to invoke § 21.055’s protection, but the protected conduct must alert the employer to the worker’s reasonable belief that unlawful sexual harassment is at issue. Reports that explicitly identify the sexual nature of the conduct generally satisfy this standard.

The retaliation write-up pattern

One particularly common retaliation pattern in sexual harassment cases involves the use of “write-ups” or progressive discipline systems following a sexual harassment report. Many employers operate point-based progressive discipline systems in which accumulated write-ups eventually trigger termination eligibility. When write-ups follow closely after a sexual harassment report, particularly when issued by the same supervisors who failed to investigate the harassment properly, the write-ups themselves can constitute adverse employment actions under § 21.055. The retaliation is structural — the employer is not merely “disciplining” the worker but is intentionally adding “points” to the worker’s file to provide cause for termination. Texas courts recognize that such patterns can dissuade a reasonable worker from reporting sexual harassment and therefore satisfy the materially-adverse-action standard.

Manney v. Goodwill Industries of Houston, Inc. — the new framework in operation

The firm’s pending matter on behalf of Shawn Manney against Goodwill Industries of Houston, Inc. — Cause No. 1243038 in Harris County Court at Law No. 3 — illustrates the new § 21.142 framework in operation against an employer that ignored its statutory duties. The matter is at the summary judgment stage; the firm filed plaintiff’s response to defendant’s traditional motion for summary judgment on September 2, 2025, arguing that defendant Goodwill applied the wrong, outdated legal standard. The brief is detailed below.

The underlying facts

In 2024, Goodwill Industries of Houston employed Shawn Manney as a “pricer” at its Westchase location. In April 2024, while both were on shift, one of Manney’s coworkers — identified in the proceedings as Patrina Johnson — pulled a sexually explicit item from a box she was sorting. She held the item — a dildo — and laughed, then put it in Manney’s face. In front of other coworkers, she asked Manney whether his “penis [was] bigger or smaller” than the dildo. The conduct was humiliating and offensive.

Manney reported the incident to his supervisor, Jesus. Goodwill’s own written policy required a “prompt, immediate and thorough investigation” conducted “in a confidential manner.” Instead, the supervisor violated Goodwill’s confidentiality policy by telling other employees that Manney had reported sexual harassment. There is no documentation of any investigation. Goodwill did not separate Manney from Patrina; they continued to be scheduled together.

On May 2, 2024, Manney filed an EEOC charge describing the harassment and the supervisor’s response. On August 28, 2024, Goodwill manager Leslie Sawyer learned that Manney had retained legal counsel and immediately emailed Goodwill’s HR Business Partner about her findings. The next day, August 29, 2024 — four months after Manney’s original report — Goodwill for the first time collected a written statement from Patrina Johnson. Manager Sawyer drafted the statement herself; Patrina merely signed it. According to Patrina’s later deposition testimony, the only corrective action she received was a verbal “talk” telling her not to repeat the behavior.

Meanwhile, Sawyer issued Manney write-ups contributing to Goodwill’s point-based termination system. The day after Sawyer’s HR email about Manney retaining counsel, Sawyer issued Manney a “final write-up.” Manney was eventually moved to a different Goodwill Houston location.

Goodwill’s corporate-representative admissions

Goodwill’s own corporate representative — speaking on behalf of the company under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2 designation — admitted in deposition that the conduct constituted sexual harassment under Goodwill’s handbook. The handbook’s definition tracks the statutory language of § 21.141(1). The corporate representative testified:

Patrina Johnson herself — the alleged harasser — also conceded in her deposition that putting a sex toy in a coworker’s face is sexual harassment, that comparing a coworker’s anatomy to a sex toy is sexual harassment, and that such conduct is “never” appropriate in the workplace.

Goodwill’s failure to apply the new statutory framework

Goodwill moved for summary judgment, arguing that the conduct was not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Manney’s] employment.” The argument applies the wrong legal standard. The brief filed by the firm on Manney’s behalf notes that Goodwill’s motion does not cite to — much less address — Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.141 and 21.142, instead relying on pre-2021 federal Title VII case law and pre-2021 Texas Chapter 21 case law applying the severe-or-pervasive standard. The brief argues:

• Manney’s claim arises under § 21.142, which does not include the severe-or-pervasive requirement.
• Goodwill’s own handbook definition of sexual harassment — adopted by Goodwill itself — tracks the statutory language of § 21.141(1) and contains no severe-or-pervasive requirement.
• Goodwill’s corporate representative admitted that the conduct met Goodwill’s handbook definition of sexual harassment.
• Goodwill failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action — no documented investigation, breached confidentiality, no separation of complainant from harasser, and the only “investigation” occurred four months after the report and only after counsel retention became known.
• Manney engaged in protected activity under § 21.055 by reporting sexual harassment; Goodwill took adverse employment actions through retaliatory write-ups; and the temporal proximity between Goodwill’s learning of counsel retention and the “final write-up” the next day supports the causal-connection inference.
• Manney exhausted administrative remedies by filing the May 2024 EEOC charge, which is reviewed with “utmost liberality” and placed Goodwill on notice of both the sexual harassment claim and the retaliation claim.

Coordinating Texas Chapter 21 with federal Title VII

The 2021 Texas amendments created a substantive divergence between Texas state law and federal Title VII for sexual harassment claims. Texas Chapter 21 no longer follows Title VII on the substantive standard for sexual harassment — § 21.141(1) does not require severity or pervasiveness, while federal Title VII continues to apply the Meritor and Harris v. Forklift “severe or pervasive” framework. The divergence is consequential and requires careful multi-framework pleading analysis.

Why workers typically still plead both Texas and federal claims

• Federal court access. Federal Title VII claims provide federal court jurisdiction (subject to procedural compliance with EEOC charge and right-to-sue requirements). Workers who prefer federal court forum for strategic reasons retain that option through Title VII.
• The McDonnell Douglas framework. Federal Title VII has six decades of developed case law on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which Texas Chapter 21 incorporates through the conformity-with-federal-law construction principle under § 21.006 for most purposes. The federal case law remains influential even where the substantive standard differs.
• Damages cap independence. Title VII and Chapter 21 damages caps under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) and Tex. Lab. Code § 21.2585 mirror each other but apply independently — a parallel pleading strategy can preserve the federal-side cap and the state-side cap separately.
• EEOC and TWC dual-charge filing. A single charge filed with either agency is generally cross-filed with the other under the work-sharing agreement, preserving claims under both frameworks. Workers should generally file the dual charge to preserve all available remedies.
• Section 1981 layer. Where the sexual harassment also involves race-based conduct or race-based motivation, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may apply as an additional layer with no statutory damages caps, four-year limitations, and no administrative exhaustion.

Why the post-2021 Texas framework matters even where federal Title VII applies

Industries most common in Texas sexual harassment litigation

Sexual harassment cases arise across the full range of Texas industries. Certain industries see particularly frequent sexual harassment litigation either because of structural workforce features that create exposure risk, because of historical patterns of inadequate response, or because of industry-specific dynamics that affect the doctrinal analysis.

The sexual harassment damages framework

Damages available for sexual harassment claims under Tex. Lab. Code Chapter 21 mirror the general Chapter 21 damages structure with caps under § 21.2585.

• Back pay. Lost wages and benefits from the date of any adverse employment action through trial. Back pay is not subject to the § 21.2585 damages cap.
• Front pay. Lost wages and benefits from trial forward where reinstatement is not feasible. Front pay is generally treated as an equitable remedy and not subject to the cap.
• Compensatory damages. Emotional distress, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and dignitary harm. Subject to the § 21.2585 cap (combined with punitive damages).
• Punitive damages. Available where the employer’s conduct meets the standard for punitive damages under Texas law. Subject to the § 21.2585 cap (combined with compensatory damages).
• Reinstatement. Where feasible and where the worker desires reinstatement.
• Injunctive relief. Prospective remedial actions including policy changes, training requirements, monitoring obligations.
• Attorney’s fees and costs. The prevailing party in a Chapter 21 case is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Tex. Lab. Code § 21.259.

The § 21.2585 caps for combined compensatory and punitive damages mirror federal Title VII caps under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3): $50,000 (15–100 employees), $100,000 (101–200), $200,000 (201–500), or $300,000 (500+ employees). The cap structure raises a distinctive issue under the new framework: § 21.2585’s tiers are based on employer size in employees, but the new § 21.141(2) extends sexual harassment coverage to employers with one or more employees. The intersection between the new coverage threshold and the older cap structure is one of several doctrinal issues that the post-2021 case law will need to resolve. For parallel federal Title VII claims, the federal cap applies independently. Where race-based sexual harassment is also implicated, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may apply with no statutory damages caps.

Statute of limitations and procedural framework

The 2021 amendments substantially restructured the limitations framework for sexual harassment claims.

The 300-day TWC charge filing window

For sexual harassment claims based on conduct on or after September 1, 2021, the worker has 300 days to file a charge of discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division. The 300-day window — extended from the prior 180-day window by House Bill 21’s amendment of § 21.201(g) — applies only to sexual harassment claims; other Chapter 21 claims (race, age, disability, etc.) continue to have the 180-day TWC charge filing deadline.

The EEOC/TWC work-sharing agreement

The EEOC and the TWC Civil Rights Division operate under a work-sharing agreement that affects how administrative charges are processed. A charge filed with either agency is generally cross-filed with the other, preserving claims under both Title VII and Chapter 21. The 300-day deadline now applies to both the Title VII charge (300 days in Texas as a deferral state) and the Chapter 21 sexual harassment charge (extended to 300 days by HB 21), making coordinated dual filing more straightforward than under prior law when the Texas deadline was 180 days and the federal deadline was 300 days.

Filing suit after the charge

After the TWC investigation concludes (or after 180 days from charge filing in some circumstances), the TWC issues a right-to-sue notice. The worker must file suit within 60 days of receiving the notice, or within two years of the charge filing, whichever is earlier. Title VII claims must be filed within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Texas state court venue

Chapter 21 claims are filed in Texas state district court (or in county court at law for smaller claims, as in Manney v. Goodwill Industries of Houston, which proceeds in Harris County Court at Law No. 3). Chapter 21 claims alone are not federally removable. Where the case also involves federal Title VII or other federal claims, the federal claims may support removal of the entire action to federal court.

Coordination with other Texas frameworks

Sexual harassment matters frequently coordinate with other Texas employment frameworks:

• Sexual harassment + race-based harassment. Where sexual harassment also involves race-based conduct, parallel claims under §§ 21.051, 21.055, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may apply.
• Sexual harassment + workers’ compensation retaliation. Where the worker was injured in connection with the sexual harassment (including through assault) and faced retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim, parallel claims under Tex. Lab. Code § 451 may apply.
• Sexual harassment + intentional infliction of emotional distress. Where the conduct was extreme and outrageous, parallel Texas common-law claims may be available, though IIED is increasingly difficult to maintain as an independent claim where statutory remedies are available.
• Sexual harassment + assault and battery. Where the sexual harassment included unwelcome physical contact, parallel Texas common-law claims for assault and battery may apply alongside the statutory claims.

The structural significance of the 2021 amendments

The 2021 amendments are among the most consequential changes to Texas employment law in decades. Several features explain their practical importance.

The framework rejects three decades of restrictive case law. The “severe or pervasive” standard from Meritor (1986) and Harris v. Forklift (1993) had hardened into a doctrine that immunized substantial portions of offensive workplace sexual conduct. Texas courts following the federal framework had developed a rich body of case law dismissing sexual harassment claims on summary judgment for failure to meet the severity-or-pervasiveness threshold. The 2021 amendments explicitly rejected this case law for Texas claims going forward — the legislature deliberately removed the gatekeeper that had foreclosed many actionable matters.

Small employers no longer enjoy categorical immunity. Under prior law, workers at sole proprietors, family businesses, and small partnerships had no Title VII or Chapter 21 sexual harassment remedy. The 15-employee threshold meant that some of the most vulnerable workers — those in small, close-quarters operations with little supervisory infrastructure — had no statutory protection. The 2021 amendments closed that gap. Every Texas employer that employs one or more employees is now within reach of Texas sexual harassment law.

Individual decisionmakers face personal accountability. Title VII and pre-2021 Chapter 21 generally limited liability to the corporate employer, sheltering individual harassers and the supervisors who failed to respond. The 2021 amendments created direct individual liability for any person who “acts directly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee.” Workers can now name the actual harasser, the supervisor who breached confidentiality, the HR representative who failed to investigate, and the executives who ratified the response — bringing personal accountability into the sexual harassment framework.

The employer’s response is now itself the cause of action. Under prior law, the employer’s response to sexual harassment was analyzed as either an element of the underlying claim or as an affirmative defense. The worker had to establish the underlying harassment first, then engage the employer’s response analysis. The 2021 amendments restructured this: § 21.142 makes the employer’s failure to take immediate and appropriate corrective action an independent unlawful employment practice. The employer’s response is on trial as the cause of action itself.

The longer limitations period prevents technical foreclosure. Workers who report sexual harassment but who do not immediately seek counsel — perhaps attempting internal resolution, attempting to continue working, or simply being unaware of the short Texas limitations period — previously found their Texas claims foreclosed at 180 days while their federal claims remained timely. The 2021 extension to 300 days eliminates this trap, aligning Texas and federal deadlines and giving workers a full window to seek counsel and file the administrative charge.

How the firm approaches sexual harassment matters

Doyle Dennis Avery LLP represents Texas workers in sexual harassment matters under the post-2021 Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.141 and 21.142 framework, alongside federal Title VII claims and other applicable frameworks. The firm’s sexual harassment practice covers the full range of conduct — coworker harassment, supervisor harassment, third-party harassment in the workplace, quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation for reporting harassment. The practice is selective by design — these matters are most successful where the documentary record supports the statutory elements, where the worker’s damages model is substantial enough to justify the litigation investment, and where the employer’s response (or non-response) meets standards supporting substantial damages and (where appropriate) the new framework’s individual-liability features.

Two of the firm’s named partners are board certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. Jeffrey Avery is board certified in Labor and Employment Law. Michael Patrick Doyle is board certified in Personal Injury Trial Law. The firm’s sexual harassment intake process typically begins with a confidential initial consultation focused on the timeline of the harassment, the timeline of the worker’s reports to the employer, the documentary record (personnel file, communications, employer policies, deposition transcripts), the employer’s response (or lack thereof), the damages model, and the procedural posture (TWC/EEOC charge filing status, 300-day deadline analysis).

The firm’s sexual harassment practice frequently coordinates with the firm’s other employment practices because sexual harassment matters often arise alongside other claims. Sexual harassment may coincide with race discrimination under § 1981 and Title VII, with workers’ compensation retaliation under § 451, with disability discrimination, with whistleblower retaliation, or with other employment claims that the firm handles concurrently. The multi-statute coordination is a core feature of the firm’s approach to complex employment litigation. Where the matter meets the firm’s criteria, representation proceeds on a contingency basis with the firm advancing litigation costs.

What workers ask about sexual harassment under updated Texas law